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Abstract 
A deep rift separates Africa and Latin America (and to a lesser extent Asia) from OECD 
countries with regard to fiscal adjustment, macroeconomic performance, and long-term 
growth. Case-study and cross-country econometric evidence drawn from a large world 
sample is provided to explain at least part of the OECD's better performance. This 
allows evaluation of Africa's generally dismal experience in the wider context of world 
development. 
Public deficits are sensitive to short-term domestic and foreign macroeconomic shocks 
but policy makers — not macro shocks — are to blame for persistent deficits and to 
compliment for sustained fiscal adjustment. Long-term tax revenue rises with per capital 
GDP. Inflation inhibits tax collection in all regions except Africa while adverse terms-of-
trade shocks reduce tax revenue only in Africa. Taxation is much heavier in OECD 
countries than in developing nations, even after controlling for differences in the levels 
of development and inflation. 
Low public deficits and central bank independence contribute significantly to 
macroeconomic stability. However, after controlling for these two variables, 
macroeconomic stability is still significantly lower in Africa than in the rest of the world. 
Fiscal adjustment does not help growth directly because it does not always provide more 
resources for overall domestic investment. Instead the contribution of lower public 
deficits to growth is indirect by enabling a more stable macroeconomy. Overall 
macroeconomic stability is shown to be a major growth determinant while its individual 
components (inflation, real exchange rate variability, foreign debt, and the black market 
premium) are typically not significant when taken individually. Africa — and Latin 
America too — is also different in its growth performance: it falls well below long-run 
growth in other developing and in industrialized regions, after controlling for all relevant 
growth determinants. 
I Introduction 
"Twenty-nine African countries drew up adjustment programs in the 
1980s .... Six of the adjusting countries had a large improvement in 
policies, nine a small improvement, and eleven a deterioration. As a 
whole, they cut their budget deficits (by a median of 1.9 percent of GDP 
between 1981-86 and 1990-91) and reduced inflation to moderate levels 
.... The six adjusting countries with the most improved macroeconomic 
policies had a median increase in GDP per capita growth of almost 2 
percentage points between 1981-86 and 1987-91. That compares with an 
increase of 1.5 percentage points for those countries with less improved 
policies and a decline of 2.6 percentage points for those with a 
deterioration in policies" (World Bank, 1994, pp. 3-4). 
Fiscal adjustment is a necessary but far from sufficient condition to achieve 
macroeconomic stability and growth, as shown by a growing body of empirical evidence 
(Sachs, 1989; Easterly, Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994). A growing number of 
cross-country studies focus on the negative effects of fiscal deficits and/or individual 
indicators of macroeconomic instability on long-term growth rates (Easterly, 1992; 
Edwards, 1992; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Ades and Chua, 1993; Chua, 1993; Corbo and 
Rojas, 1993; Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers, 1993; Easterly and Rebelo, 
1993; Fischer, 1993; Khan and Kumar, 1993; King and Levine, 1993). Barro and Lee 
(1993) and Easterly and Levine (1994) compare Africa's growth performance to that of 
other developing and industrialized countries, concluding that "Africa is different" as 
reflected by a large and significant negative effect of a dummy variable for Africa in 
cross-country growth regressions. Elbadawi and Ndulu (1994) decompose the explained 
difference in growth performance between Africa and other developing countries using 
regression results from ten cross-country studies. They conclude that the two main 
variables explaining Africa's dismal growth record have been the larger real exchange 
rate misalignment and the more adverse terms-of-trade shocks observed in Africa. 
This paper differs from this literature in two dimensions. First, it disentangles the 
empirical relations between fiscal adjustment, conventional and unconventional taxation, 
macroeconomic stability, and growth. It does so by reviewing previous work (Easterly 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994a; McMahon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1995) and providing fresh 
econometric cross-country evidence on these relations. Second, by focusing on a world 
sample that includes sub-Saharan African economies, this paper extends the question "Is 
Africa Different?" — limited by the existing literature to the performance of growth — 
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to the behaviour of public deficits, taxation, and the level of overall macroeconomic 
instability. 
Section II provides comparative cross-country information on long-run fiscal and 
macroeconomic performance, as well as their correlations, and discusses the ways in 
which fiscal and macroeconomic variables interact. Next the focus is on the causality 
from macroeconomic variables to public deficits and tax revenue, providing country 
evidence of the short-term impact of macroeconomic shocks on deficits and cross-country 
econometric evidence of the long-term effects of per capita income and inflation on tax 
revenue. Section IV looks at the inverse causality, running from fiscal adjustment to 
macroeconomic stability and growth. Following a two-stage approach, long-term cross-
country results are provided first on the impact of fiscal surpluses on macroeconomic 
stability, and then, using a Barro-type growth equation, on the contribution of fiscal 
adjustment and macroeconomic stability to growth. Section V reviews briefly the 
experience of two African countries, Ghana and Zimbabwe, that illustrates how fiscal 
adjustment (or the lack thereof) contributes to macroeconomic health, and how the latter 
raises growth. A final section concludes. 
II Fiscal adjustment and macroeconomic 
performance across the world 
Fiscal adjustment and macroeconomic performance are closely related. As is widely 
recognized, fiscal indicators, like the deficit and the level of taxation, and macroeconomic 
performance indicators, like inflation, the current account, and growth, influence each 
other in both directions. This section summarizes the long-run performance — generally 
from the 1960s to the early 1990s — of fiscal and macroeconomic variables and their 
correlations across the world and by major industrialized and developing regions, 
including Africa. 
Fiscal stance 
The most widely used gauge of fiscal strength is the conventional measure of the public 
deficit, defined as the nominal (or total) deficit and frequently limited to the central or 
general government. But popularity does not guarantee economic relevance, and this is 
particularly true for this conventional indicator. In fact, nominal government deficits 
present major shortcomings as reliable indicators of fiscal stance, sustainability, and 
solvency.1,2 However, in the absence of systematic cross-country estimates of correct 
deficit measures and assessments of fiscal sustainability, we are limited to using the 
conventional deficit as the only widely available indicator of fiscal health. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 report evidence on nominal deficits of the public sector as ratios 
of GDP across the world. When available, the deficit measure refers to the consolidated 
non-financial public sector (CNFPS); alternatively, coverage is limited to the central or 
general government. The data reported here (and for other fiscal and macroeconomic 
variables in subsequent tables and figures below) reflect long-run averages of annual 
observations for each country (in the figures) and unweighted group averages of four 
major regions of developing and industrialized countries (in the tables) for a large country 
sample.3 Time coverage ranges between 1960-1991 and 1970-1990 and sub-periods refer 
roughly to decades. 
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Table 1 Public deficit by world regions, various periods 
(% of GDP) 
1970-79 1980-90 1970-90 
Developing Countries 5.3 6.4 6.0 
Africa 6.4 7.5 7.0 
LAC 4.6 5.6 5.3 
Other LDCs 4.5 6.1 5.6 
OECD Countries 1.2 3.7 2.5 
World 3.9 5.4 4.8 
Source: See Appendix for country coverage. 
Figure 1 
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Public deficits have been rising throughout the last two decades. At world level, 
the public deficit to GDP ratio has increased from 3.9% of GDP in the 1970s to 5.4% 
of GDP in the 1980s. This trend is common to all major world regions. However, the 
average long-term public deficit in LDCs — at 6.0% of GDP — exceeds by far the 2.5% 
of GDP observed in OECD countries. Among the three developing regions, Africa has 
the highest public deficit, at 7.0% of GDP. The long-term fiscal performance of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) and other LDCs is somewhat better, with figures of 
5.3% and 5.6% of GDP, respectively. 
There is substantial country variation in fiscal performance within each region 
(Figure 1). The (few) African observations vary between a minimum long-term deficit 
of 3.6% of GDP in Ghana and a maximum of 13.8% of GDP in Zambia. Even among 
OECD countries one finds massive differences in long-term public balances, ranging from 
a surplus of 4.0% of GDP in Norway to a 9.8% deficit in Italy. Variations over time 
are also common, as exemplified by some successful fiscal adjusters in the three 
developing regions like Ghana, Chile and Thailand that turned large deficits in the 1970s 
into small deficits or surpluses in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
A similar structural difference between developing and OECD countries is observed 
in the case of long-term conventional tax revenue (Table 2 and Figure 2). Average 
collection of conventional taxes attained only 15.7% of GDP in developing countries 
during 1960-1990, less than half the 35.3% average long-term tax revenue in the OECD. 
The larger tax shares in OECD countries suggest that public spending is a superior good, 
an hypothesis that will be tested below. Across the three developing regions tax revenue 
reaches a remarkably similar ratio to GDP. But within each region, country variations 
of up to 20% of GDP are observed. 
Conventional taxes are the main form of public expenditure financing. However, 
two unconventional forms of taxation are often an important source for financing 
conventional public sector deficits: the implicit revenue collected from inflation and 
financial repression. In the absence of systematic cross-country evidence on inflation tax 
collection, Table 3 reports data on seignorage revenue — the sum of the inflation tax and 
the resources obtained from growing money demand — that therefore overstates the size 
of the underlying inflation tax. 
On average, seignorage is a rather modest source of deficit revenue. In OECD 
countries, the 1.0% of GDP collected as seignorage is exceeded by the highest individual 
excise tax revenue, such as liquor or mineral oil, which has averaged 1.1% of GDP 
(Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994a). In developing countries, seignorage at 2.1% of 
GDP doubles the level reached in OECD countries and also exceeds the largest individual 
excise tax revenue (at 1.1% of GDP), but still is low when compared to the significant 
economic costs of inflation. 
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Table 2 Conventional tax revenue by world regions, 1960-90 
(% of GDP) % 
Developing Countries 15.7 
Africa 15.5 
LAC 16.4 
Other LDCs 15.0 
OECD Countries 35.3 
World 19.9 
Source: See Appendix for country coverage. 
Figure 2 Tax revenue (% of GDP) 1960-1990 
Countries 
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Table 3 Unconventional tax revenue in industrial and developing countries 
7 
1. Inflation arid Seignorage, 1970-88 
Inflation rate Seiqnoraqe 
(%) (% of GDP) 
15 OECD Countries 8.5 1.0 
35 Developing Countries 50.1 2.1 
9 African Countries 23.4 2.1 
Note: Unweighted averages of individual countries. 
Date Source: Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994b) 
2. Real Interest Rates and Financial Repression Tax Revenue, 1980-88 
Financial 
repression tax 
Real interest rate revenue 
(%) (% of GDP) 
Ghana -18.3 0.5 
Mexico -8.4 1.6 
Zimbabwe -4.3 0.8 
Note: The interest rate is the average annual ex-post real rate in time deposits of 
banking systems, calculated using CPI inflation. The implicit revenue due to financial 
repression is calculated as the difference between domestic real interest rates and the 
OECD real interest rate (0.9%) times the outstanding stock of deposits as percentage 
of GDP. 
Source: Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994a). 
In fact, inflation rises exponentially with seignorage (and beyond the maximum of 
the Laffer curve it declines with inflation)4, as reflected by the fact that developing 
countries have an average rate of inflation of 50.1% per year, six times the average 
OECD inflation rate. 
The nine African countries included in the sample show an average level of 
seignorage equal to that in other developing countries. However, Africa 's inflation is 
only 23 .4%, well below average inflation in other developing regions that include the 
8 SPECIAL PAPER 1 9 
high-inflation Latin American countries. 
Financial repression in the form of sub-market (and often negative) real interest 
rates is a second form of unconventional, implicit taxation. In three developing countries 
with significant negative real interest rates during 1980-88 (Table 3), financial repression 
has raised on average 1 % of GDP. Its cost in terms of financial disintermediation and 
inefficient resource allocation has led many OECD and developing countries to liberalize 
their domestic financial markets throughout the last 20 years. In fact, financial repression 
taxation is on a world-wide decline. 
We conclude that the three developing regions show a remarkably similar fiscal 
picture although a large country dispersion is observed within each individual region. 
Long-term fiscal deficit to GDP ratios at 6% are high in the developing world, almost 
tripling the deficit level in OECD countries. Conventional tax revenue is homogeneously 
low at around 15.7% of GDP in the three developing regions, a figure that is 20% of 
GDP below the OECD's tax collection. Developing countries often resort to 
unconventional forms of taxation: the implicit revenue collected from inflation and 
financial repression. These are ineffective ways of taxation; they collect little and 
sacrifice macroeconomic stability and financial development. 
Macroeconomic performance 
Macroeconomic performance is herein compared across world regions by using two 
measures: an index of macroeconomic health (or stability)5 and GDP growth. To reflect 
overall macroeconomic stability, different frequently used indicators of macro 
performance are combined into one index. Among the possible indicators are four 
variables that are both frequently used and widely available for a large number of 
countries. They are: the annual inflation cost measure (inf)6; the coefficient of variation 
of the real exchange rate (the latter defined as the product of the nominal exchange rate 
to the US$ and the US CPI, divided by the domestic CPI) (rercv); the total foreign debt 
to GDP ratio (debt); and the percentage black market premium over the official exchange 
rate (prem). These four variables have been used (directly or through an appropriate 
transformation) in many cross-country studies of fiscal and growth performance (Easterly, 
Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994; Easterly and Rebelo; 1993; Fischer, 1993; 
Easterly and Levine, 1994). The disadvantage of using them individually is that they 
reflect a partial picture of macroeconomic health or stability, hence they are combined 
into one index of macro performance. Given their numerical similarity in a large cross-
country sample, and in the absence of a welfare-based criterion for deciding on their 
weights, they are assigned equal weight by adding them to obtain the following index of 
macroeconomic instability (mins), which is negatively related to macroeconomic health 
or stability:7 
FISCAL ADUSTMENT AND GROWTH IN AND OUT OF AFRICA 9 
mins = inf + rercv -I- debt + prem (1) 
Lack of macroeconomic stability is a general feature of developing countries (Table 
4 and Figure 3). The index mins attains a long-term (1970-1990) value of 1.19 in the 
developing world, a figure almost five times the average level reached in OECD 
countries. The three developing regions show similarly high levels of instability, with 
Africa at 1.22 almost matching LAC's 1.25 value, while other LDCs show a slightly 
better macroeconomic performance at a level of 1.03. Country variations within each 
developing region are very large. In Africa, macroeconomic instability ranges from a 
low of 0.54 (Mauritius) to a high of 2.32 (Zambia). While the country dispersion is 
almost as large as LAC and other LDCs, OECD countries are homogeneously stable in 
their macroeconomic performance. 
The second indicator of macroeconomic performance, per capita GDP growth, 
shows a dismal picture for Africa and Latin America (Table 5 and Figure 4). Average 
1960-1991 growth at 1.3% per annum in all LDCs has been less than half the OECD 
growth rate during the same period. In addition, world growth declined from 2.4% in 
the 1960s and 1970s to a bare 0.3% in 1980-1991. Africa's already modest growth in 
the 1960s and 1970s turned negative in the 1980s, reaching -0.6%, only surpassed by 
LAC's -0.8% during Latin America's "lost decade of development". 
However, other LDCs, strongly influenced by East Asia, show a better average 
long-term growth performance, even surpassing the 2.7% long-term growth recorded in 
the OECD. The difference between growth rates in other LDCs and OECD, on one 
hand, and Africa and LAC, on the other, reflects increasing unconditional divergence in 
income levels among poorer and richer regions in the world. 
As in the case of macroeconomic instability, much intra-regional variance 
characterizes each region's growth performance. Even when dismissing three high-
growth outliers — Botswana, Korea, and Japan — Africa, LAC and other LDCs show 
major growth differences among their countries (see Figure 4). In the OECD, however, 
growth shows much less dispersion. 
We conclude that developing regions differ markedly from the industrialized nations 
in regard to macroeconomic performance. Africa and LAC (and other LDCs to a lesser 
extent) show high levels of macroeconomic instability in comparison to the OECD. 
Africa's and LAC's dismal growth performance stands in stark contrast to the high-
growth path attained by other LDCs and OECD economies. 
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Table 4 Macroeconomic instability index by major world regions, 1970-90 
Developing Countries 1.19 
Africa 1.22 
LAC 1.25 
Other LDCs 1.03 
OECD Countries 0.26 
World 0.99 
Note: See Appendix for country coverage. 
Figure 3 Macroeconomic instability index (1970-1990) 
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Table 5 Per capita GDP growth by major world regions, various periods (%) 
1960-69 1970-79 1980-91 1960-91 
Developing Countries 1.9 2.3 0.0 1.3 
Africa 1.2 1.6 -0.6 0.6 
LAC 2.2 2.3 -0.8 1.0 
Other LDCs 2.9 4.0 2.3 2.8 
OECD Countries 4.2 2.6 1.6 2.7 
World 2.4 2.4 0.3 1.6 
Note: See Appendix for country coverage. 
Figure 4 Per capita GDP growth rate (1960-1991) 
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Fiscal stance and macroeconomic performance; 
Correlation and causality 
Public deficits and the macroeconomy are causally linked in both directions. On one 
hand, foreign and domestic macroeconomic shocks impinge on many components of 
public spending and revenue. For instance, lower export prices depress the revenue from 
export firms, higher inflation often shrinks the tax intake, and a domestic recession raises 
spending on social assistance and lowers the tax base. The reverse causality is observed 
when public deficits affect the performance of the overall economy. Public deficits affect 
domestic output, inflation, interest rates, and real exchange rates by magnitudes that 
depend on the extent of price rigidities, the way deficits are financed, and how the 
private sector responds to fiscal policy. 
The two-way causality is one reason not to expect a strong correlation between 
public deficits and other economic variables. Other good reasons are that fiscal deficits 
are measured in different ways across countries, introducing some measurement error 
into the sample. In addition, the theoretical relations between deficits and other 
macroeconomic variables depend crucially on the means of financing the deficits.8 And 
partial correlations may fail to be significant because of the omission of other variables. 
Despite these caveats, significant statistical relationship can be found between the deficit 
and many, though not all, macroeconomic performance variables.9 
Making use of the cross-country data introduced above, simple cross-country 
correlations between average long-term fiscal and macroeconomic variables are reported 
in Table 6. The results show high long-run correlations between fiscal variables, 
measures of macro instability, and growth. By construction, the index of macroeconomic 
instability (mins) is highly correlated with each of its four additive components: the 
inflation measure (inf), real exchange rate variability (rercv), the foreign debt to GDP 
ratio (debt), and the black-market premium (prem). 
More interestingly, the correlation coefficients between macroeconomic instability 
and the public sector balance to GDP ratio (fibal) and tax revenue (tax) are high (-0.55 
and -0.69, respectively). Both fibal and tax show high individual correlations, in the 
range of-0.55 to -0.64, with two determinants of mins: foreign debt (debt) and the black 
market premium (prem). However, fiscal variables are only weakly correlated with 
inflation. The low correlation between fibal and inf suggests that the inflation tax is only 
one among many ways to finance budget deficits. The correlation between tax and inf 
is stronger (-0.40), suggesting that conventional taxation and inflation taxation are either 
financing substitutes or that inflation reduces tax revenue directly through Keynes-
Olivera-Tanzi effects. This hypothesis is subject to more systematic testing below. 
With regard to the correlations between growth and fiscal variables it is interesting 
to note the positive but weak correlation between per capita GDP growth (g) and tax, and 
the larger positive correlation between g and fibal. Much larger, however, are the 
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negative correlations between growth and two components of macro instability (debt and 
prem), and, in particular, between growth and our overall indicator of macro instability 
(-0.64). 
Three preliminary inferences can be drawn from this set of associations between 
fiscal variables and indicators of macroeconomic performance. First, the fiscal balance 
is a useful indicator of macroeconomic health despite problems of comparability across 
countries, simultaneity in causal relations, and misspecification. Second, the fiscal 
balance is strongly and negatively correlated with macroeconomic instability. Third, 
growth is more strongly correlated with macroeconomic instability than with fiscal 
deficits. However, before drawing strong inferences from bivariate correlations we have 
to focus more carefully on the bi-directional causality between deficits and macro 
variables. This is the purpose of the next two sections. 
Table 6 Simple correlation coefficients between fiscal and macroeconomic variables for 
1970-92 country averages (49 developing and OECD countries) 
fibal tax inf rercv debt prem mins g 
fibal 1 0.41 -0.18 -0.08 -0.62 -0.54 -0.55 0.41 
tax 1 -0.40 -0.28 -0.63 -0.64 -0.69 0.28 
inf 1 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.64 -0.29 
rercv 1 0.30 0.42 0.59 -0.24 
debt 1 0.64 0.86 -0.59 
prem 1 0.86 -0.65 
mins 1 -0.64 
9 1 
Note: see Appendix for country coverage. 
Ill How does macroeconomic performance 
affect public deficits and tax revenue? 
This section looks at the ways in which certain macroeconomic variables affect public 
deficits and tax revenue. First the influence of macroeconomic shocks on public deficits 
is discussed, comparing it to the role of fiscal policy variables in shaping deficits. Then 
country level empirical evidence is provided for the role of inflation, real exchange rate 
devaluation, and growth in determining the level of tax revenue in developing countries. 
Finally, systematic cross-country evidence on the effects of income levels, inflation rates, 
and terms-of-trade shocks on tax revenue is provided for a world sample. 
How sensitive are public deficits to macroeconomic 
shocks and policy changes? 
Changes in the foreign and domestic macroeconomic environment impinge directly or 
indirectly on public sector revenue and expenditure items. Zimbabwe provides an 
illustration of the sensitivity of public budgets to changes in foreign and domestic 
macroeconomic variables in the late 1980s (Table 7). The domestic real interest rate has 
a significant effect on the deficit, resulting from Zimbabwe's high domestic public debt. 
A one percentage point (pp) increase in the real interest rate raises the deficit by 0.4 pp 
of GDP, as domestic debt to GDP stands at 40%. Interestingly, inflation has a lower 
positive effect on the deficit than the real interest rate. The reason is that the 0.40 effect 
on the deficit via higher nominal interest payments of a 1 pp rise in inflation is in part 
compensated by the positive bracket-creep effect of inflation on income taxation. A 
devaluation contributes to a slightly lower deficit in Zimbabwe: the increase in the 
foreign interest bill is more than compensated by higher tax collection from import taxes 
and direct taxes on traded-goods producing sectors. Finally, growth has a strong 
negative effect on the public deficit. 
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Table 7 Sensitivity of non-financial public sector deficits to changes in 
macroeconomic determinants: Zimbabwe 1988 
Changes in 
domestic and foreign 
macroeconomic determinants 
Changes in NFPS Deficit 
(Percentage Points of GDP) 
1 pp increase of domestic inflation 
1 pp increase of domestic real interest rate 
1 % devaluation of real exchange rate 
1 pp increase of foreign interest rate 
1 % growth of real GDP 
-0.06 
0.25 
0.31 
0.40 
-0.37 
Note: based on 1987/88 and 1988/89 CNFPS budgets, pp = percentage points. 
Source: Morand6 and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994). 
This example illustrates the strong effects of macroeconomic shocks on the short-run 
behaviour of public budgets. The central question to be addressed now is how significant 
these shocks are relative to variables under the control of fiscal policy makers in shaping 
fiscal outcomes. This issue is addressed by comparing the role of fiscal policy variables 
with the influence of foreign and domestic macro variables in the medium to long-term 
evolution of public deficits. Based on the deficit decomposition methodology by Marshall 
and Schmidt-Hebbel (1989a,b), changes of public sector deficits are attributed to changes 
in the three groups of deficit determinants: foreign macroeconomic, domestic 
macroeconomic, and fiscal policy variables (the latter controlled by policy makers). The 
relative contribution of each group of deficit determinants, averaged over long periods, 
is summarized for Chile, Ghana and Zimbabwe in Table 8. 
Chile's fiscal experience reflects four distinct periods: massive fiscal stabilization 
(1974-76), consolidation of public sector retrenchment (1977-80), crisis and deficit 
explosion (1981-84) and, again, deep fiscal stabilization (1985-89). Fiscal policy makers 
are the main actors behind this experience, achieving CNFPS surpluses of 1% to 4% of 
GDP in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On average, the relative contribution of fiscal 
policy variables to changes (and therefore to trend reduction) in the deficit is 142%. 
Hence the changes in fiscal policy variables more than compensated for the strongly 
negative contribution of domestic macroeconomic variables and the slightly negative 
contribution of external variables. 
Ghana is a case of more gradual but similarly successful fiscal adjustment. The 
contribution of fiscal policy variables to this turn-around is also dominant, explaining on 
average 91% of the change in the deficit. Improvements in domestic macro variables 
helped to a small extent, contributing by 11 % to the fluctuations and structural correction 
of the central government deficit in Ghana. 
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Table 8 Average contribution of foreign, domestic and fiscal policy variables to the 
changes in CNFPS deficits in Chile, Ghana and Zimbabwe (%) 
Relative Contribution of: 
Foreign Macro Domestic Macro Fiscal Policy 
Variables Variables Variables 
Chile (1974-89) -1 -41 + 142 
Ghana (1971-89) -2 + 11 + 91 
Zimbabwe (1980-88) -11 + 1 + 110 
Note: The figures for Ghana for the 1971-1981 sub-period are fiscal-year data for 
1971/72 - 1981/82, and those for Zimbabwe are for fiscal years throughout 1980-
1988. 
Source: Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994a). 
Zimbabwe shows a substantial deterioration in its CNFPS budget after 1982 that is 
partly reversed by a limited fiscal stabilization started in 1988. Zimbabwean policy 
makers compensated for the influence of variables beyond their control: changes in fiscal 
policy variables explain 110% of the variation of public deficits, neutralizing the negative 
contribution of foreign interest shocks to the deficit. 
A central conclusion emerges from these three cases: fiscal policy changes dominate 
in absolute terms these countries' experiences of fiscal adjustment or deterioration. 
External and domestic macroeconomic shocks play a minor, and often even negative, role 
in the medium-term variation and structural changes of public sector budgets. Active 
fiscal policies are both the main culprit in fiscal crises and an effective instrument in 
bringing about fiscal stabilization and adjustment. Fiscal policy makers are to blame for 
enduring public sector disequilibrium and to be praised for lasting fiscal adjustment. 
Effects of macroeconomic stabilization and growth on 
taxation 
There are various channels through which macroeconomic stabilization and growth affect 
tax revenue. Here the focus is on country evidence of how tax collection is affected by 
inflation, the real exchange rate, and output.10 
FISCAL ADUSTMENT AND GROWTH IN AND OUT OF AFRICA 1 7 
Inflation affects tax collection in opposite ways, depending on the tax systems in 
place. Tax collection lags in non-fully indexed tax systems (for example, nominally fixed 
excise taxes) lead to declining real revenue when inflation increases (this is sometimes 
called the Keynes-Olivera-Tanzi effect).11 Inflation also tends to lead to public 
demoralization and hence to lower compliance and enforcement of tax payments. 
However, if income brackets are non-indexed, higher inflation leads to bracket creep and 
hence higher direct taxation. 
Evidence of the effects of inflation on tax revenue in six developing countries, based 
on results from estimated tax revenue functions,12 shows a distinction between countries 
according to the net influence of inflation on tax revenue (Table 9). Inflation lowers 
taxes in Colombia (aggregate tax revenue) and in Ghana (both direct and indirect taxes). 
The opposite is true in Zimbabwe, where inflation raises direct tax revenue, a result of 
bracket creep as income tax brackets are not indexed to inflation. The third category of 
countries comprises Chile (direct and indirect taxes), Morocco (total taxes), Pakistan 
(direct, indirect, and trade taxes), and Zimbabwe (indirect and direct taxes), where 
inflation does not significantly affect tax collection. The reason could be that their tax 
systems display short collection lags, indexation of tax revenue, and indexation of income 
brackets. 
The real exchange rate (RER) could also affect public revenue in either direction. 
Direct and indirect taxation on income or sales of traded goods is boosted by a 
depreciation, while the opposite happens to taxation on non-traded goods-producing 
sectors. Hence the net effect of the RER on tax revenue depends on the relative weight 
of traded and non-traded categories in total tax revenue. This is borne out by the 
evidence on the effects of the RER on tax revenue in three developing countries (Table 
9). Total tax revenue declines with a real devaluation in Colombia, presumably because 
of the negative correlation between the RER and quantitative import restrictions 
or because of a highly elastic import demand.13 The opposite is true for Ghana and 
Zimbabwe, where various revenue categories (direct and indirect taxes in Ghana, direct 
and trade taxes in Zimbabwe) are increased by devaluation. This is presumably because 
traded-goods activities (sales and production) are taxed more heavily than non-traded 
activities. Because the remaining tax categories are shown to be insensitive to the RER, 
aggregate tax revenue rises with a more depreciated RER in the latter two countries. 
Finally, cyclical and trend output (or growth) affect taxation in different ways. Tax 
collection behaves pro-cyclically due to the strong correlation between output and most 
tax bases. Trend output or long-term growth tends to raise tax bases more than income. 
Should growth therefore be seen as a cure to public deficits? If growth is high enough, 
it is sometimes argued, tax bases expand and hence countries can grow out of deficits. 
This view is flawed for two reasons. First, it neglects the fact that not only tax bases but 
also successful pressures for higher public expenditure rise with output levels. Second, 
growth will not materialize if public deficits are large, inflation and real interest rates are 
high, and hence private investment is low. 
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Table 9 The impact of inflation and real exchange rate devaluations on tax revenue: 
country evidence from tax revenue functions 
A. Effects of inflation on tax revenue 
Negative Zero Positive 
Colombia: Total taxes 
(1972-1987) 
Chile: Direct taxes, 
indirect taxes 
1973-1989) 
Zimbabwe: Direct 
taxes 
(1970/71-1988/89) 
Ghana: Direct taxes, 
indirect taxes 
(1970/71-1988) 
Morocco: Total taxes 
Pakistan: Direct taxes, 
trade taxes, indirect taxes 
(1972/73-1987/88) 
Zimbabwe: Indirect taxes, 
total taxes 
(1970/71-1988/89) 
B. Effects of a RER devaluation on tax revenue 
Negative Positive 
Colombia: Total taxes Ghana: Direct taxes, total taxes 
(1972-1987) (1970/71-1988) 
Zimbabwe: Direct taxes, indirect 
taxes (1970/71-1988/89) 
Source: Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994a). 
What determines long-term tax revenue? 
A stylized fact of development is the non-linear relationship between tax revenue and 
income: the share of total tax revenue in GDP ratio tends to rise with per capita GDP 
levels. The positive influence of income on taxation reflects the notion that both the will 
and the ability to tax increase with the level of development (Musgrave, 1959, 1969; 
Hinrichs, 1966; Gillis, 1989; Tanzi, 1991; Burgess and Stern, 1993). A second often-
quoted empirical regularity is the negative influence of inflation on tax revenue. Inflation 
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has an ambiguous impact on tax revenue when bracket creep is observed. Otherwise, as 
discussed above, inflation unambiguously reduces tax revenue. The potential negative 
impact of the direct ways by which inflation affects conventional tax collection is 
increased by an indirect negative effect that arises when the inflation tax is a substitute 
for conventional taxation and as long as it remains at levels consistent with the left-hand 
or "correct" side of the money-demand Laffer curve. Finally, it is often stated that 
adverse terms-of-trade shocks erode tax revenue by reducing taxation on exports or 
income from exportable production.14 
The influence of these three variables on tax revenue will be tested by using the 
following linear relation:15 
tax = 7o + Ti Igdp + 72 i n f + 7s totsh (2) 
where tax is the tax revenue to GDP ratio defined above, lgdp is the log 
level of long-run average per capita real GDP, inf is the inflation 
measure introduced above, and totsh is the income loss from adverse 
terms-of-trade shocks as a ratio to GDP. Expected coefficient signs are: 
To>0?T1>0;72''V3<0. 
Table 10 reports cross-country regression results for equation (2), adding a regional 
dummy variable for OECD countries (oecd). The sample comprises long-term (1960-
1990) country averages for three different country groupings. The first set of four 
regressions for 70-77 developing and OECD countries shows that tax collection increases 
significantly with the level of development (proxied by GDP per capita) and falls 
unambiguously and significantly with inflation. Adverse terms-of-trade shocks tend to 
reduce tax collection, although their effect is barely significant at conventional levels and 
only when controlling for OECD countries. The significance of the OECD dummy in 
regressions 1.3 and 1.4 reflects the structural difference in tax collection between 
developing and industrialized economies.16 It shows that OECD countries are able to 
collect 8 to 10 percentage points of GDP more than developing nations, after controlling 
for their higher development and lower inflation. 
For the subset of 54-60 developing countries the qualitative conclusions derived 
from the all-country sample are confirmed, albeit individual and overall significance 
levels are lower than above. The evidence reported here dominates substantially the 
recent cross-country results obtained by Burgess and Stern (1993, p. 774) for the tax 
revenue ratio as a function only of the log of per capita GNP.17 
For the sub-sample of 22-27 African countries the overall fit is superior to the larger 
subset of LDCs. The level of development is still the dominant determinant of tax 
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Table 10 Long-term tax revenue 
(Cross-country regressions for three country groupings) 
tax = Yo + Y\ Igdp + y2 inf + y3 totsh + y4 oecd 
Regression Constant Igdp inf totsh oecd R2A F n 
1. All Countries 
1.1 -0 .025 0 .058 -0 .212 -0 .014 0 .74 65.5 70 
(-0.3) (11.7) (-2.1) (-1.6) 
1.2 0 .087 0 .054 -0.303 0.68 83.3 77 
(0.9) (11.0) (-3.0) 
1.3 0 .047 0.039 -0 .164 -0 .014 0.076 0.76 56.2 70 
(0.5) (5.8) (-1.8) (-1.9) (2.9) 
1.4 0 .141 0 .032 -0.208 0.096 0.72 67.7 77 
(1.6) (4.0) (-2.5) (3.2) 
2. Developing Countries 
2.1 0 .048 0 .036 -0.14 -0.011 0.33 9.8 54 
(0.5) (5.1) (-1.6) (-1.5) 
2.2 0.131 0 .029 -0.178 0 .20 8.4 60 
(1.5) (3.5) (-2.1) 
3. African Countries 
3.1 -0 .199 0 .049 0 .056 
(-0.9) (5.0) (0.3) 
3.2 -0 .073 0.041 -0.016 
(-0.4) (4.3) (-0.1) 
3.3 -0 .135 0 .046 
(-2.9) (6.0) 
-0.016 _ 0.46 7.0 22 
(-2.5) 
_ _ 0.27 5.7 27 
-0.017 _ 0.49 10.9 22 
(-2.6) 
Note: OLS estimations with heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix; See Appendix for country 
coverage 
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collection. But inflation drops out while adverse terms-of-trade shocks play a significant 
role in reducing the tax intake. 
We conclude four points: 
• The level of development is the single most important determinant of tax 
revenue. 
• Inflation inhibits tax collection in all regions except Africa. 
• Adverse terms-of-trade shocks are more important in Africa than in other 
regions in inhibiting tax collection, probably a reflection of Africa's 
heavier reliance on export taxation. 
• OECD countries are able to collect more taxes than developing nations, 
after controlling for their higher level of development and lower inflation. 
IV Fiscal adjustment, macroeconomic instability 
and growth 
This section looks at the causality from fiscal stance to macroeconomic instability and to 
growth in a two-stage setting, relying on long-run cross-country regression results. First 
the influence of public sector surpluses and central bank independence on macroeconomic 
stability is assessed. Then the contribution of both fiscal surpluses and macroeconomic 
stability on long-run growth is measured, controlling for other determinants of cross-
country growth differences. 
Fiscal adjustment and growth 
Fiscal adjustment could have contractionary short-term effects while being expansionary 
in the long term, particularly when the initial condition is one of a large fiscal 
disequilibrium associated with high macroeconomic instability and distorted financial 
markets. This trade-off between short-term economic costs and long-term economic 
benefits is often worsened by the political-economy costs of fiscal adjustment. Not 
surprisingly, decisive and consistent fiscal adjustment tends to be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
The potential contractionary effects of deficit reduction depend on the incidence of 
an economy's market rigidities and externalities. Here the views vary between neo-
Keynesians asserting the importance of these rigidities and neoclassical dismissing 
them.18 
The long-term effects of fiscal adjustment on growth depend on two channels: the 
resource contribution to higher domestic investment and the reduction in 
financial/monetary market distortions and macroeconomic instability. 
Reducing public deficits involves by definition a combination of lower public 
investment and higher public saving. If the reduction in public investment is lower than 
the indirect contribution higher public saving makes to private investment, fiscal 
adjustment raises capital formation and hence growth. But the contribution of fiscal 
adjustment to growth through this first resource-flow channel is generally ambiguous. 
Does higher public saving raise national saving, and does the latter translate into 
higher domestic investment? Empirical evidence shows that raising public saving is an 
effective contribution of public policy to raise national saving. The reason is that 
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Ricardian Equivalence (Barro, 1974) is typically rejected; when fiscal stabilization boosts 
public saving through cuts in current expenditure, the private sector does not offset this 
increase one-to-one but reduces its saving only by a fraction of the rise in public saving.19 
Explicit rejection of the Ricardian proposition for developing countries has been provided 
by Haque and Montiel (1989), Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), and Easterly, 
Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994).20 
As long as financial markets are not completely open and domestic assets are 
imperfect substitutes for external assets, higher national saving will tend to reduce 
domestic interest rates and raise domestic investment. The international evidence 
supports this hypothesis. Frankel (1992) concludes that perfect capital mobility is 
rejected even for open OECD countries, as large real interest rate differentials are still 
observed. This implies that part of the increase in national saving will be reflected in 
higher domestic investment. However, the part of the increase in national saving that 
does not translate into more domestic investment, which hence is reflected by a lower 
current account deficit, is still important. Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994a) conclude 
for a sample of ten developing countries that a significant share of lower public deficits 
is reflected in lower current account deficits, providing evidence to Rodriguez' (1994) 
fiscal approach to the current account. 
The second channel by which fiscal adjustment can contribute to growth stems from 
the shift in financing and improved fiscal stability derived from lower public deficits. 
The need for unconventional, distortionary, and unstable forms of taxation — mostly the 
inflation and financial repression taxes — diminishes when conventional, explicit, and 
more stable forms of taxation are strengthened and public expenditure is cut. This leads 
to financial deepening, lower relative price variability, and a more stable tax system. 
The resulting improvement in financial intermediation and macroeconomic stability 
improves resource allocation, raises the quantity and quality of private investment (see 
Corbo and Rojas, 1993; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; and Serven and Solimano, 1994), 
and therefore raises growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Fischer, 1993; and Easterly and 
Levine, 1994). 
We conclude that fiscal adjustment potentially affects growth through two channels. 
The first channel, based on the resource-flow effects of public investment and saving on 
domestic investment, is generally ambiguous. The second channel, based on the effects 
of improved financial intermediation and a more stable macroeconomic environment on 
resource allocation and the quality and quantity of private investment, is unambiguously 
positive. The empirical dimension of these channels is explored next. 
Do fiscal surpluses and central bank independence 
contribute to long-term macroeconomic stability? 
We start by looking at impact of public sector deficits on overall macroeconomic 
instability. We control for the degree of independence of the central bank as a 
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determinant of the monetary stance and hence of overall macroeconomic instability. For 
this variable we use the Cukierman et al. (1992) rate of average central bank board 
turnover per year (torb), a measure that is negatively correlated with central bank 
independence. A systematic way to identify the effect of public sector balances and 
central bank (in)dependence on macroeconomic instability is by estimating the following 
simple linear relation:21 
mins = a0 = fibal + a2 torb (3) 
with expected coefficient signs: a 0 ^ 0 , a , < 0 ; a 2 > 0 . 
Table 11 reports cross-country regression results for Equation 3, adding a regional 
dummy variable for Africa (africa). The sample comprises long-term (1970-1990) 
country averages for both developing and OECD economies. Both the public surplus and 
central bank independence have a significant influence on macroeconomic stability 
(regressions 1 and 2). Inclusion of the Africa dummy improves the overall fit and 
weakens somewhat the contribution of the fiscal balance to macroeconomic instability 
(regressions 3 and 4).22 We conclude that across the world a prudent fiscal stance and 
central bank independence are significant determinants of macroeconomic stability. 
However, once controlling for these two determinants, macroeconomic stability is still 
significantly lower in Africa for reasons open to future inquiry. 
Do public deficits and macroeconomic instability impair 
growth? 
Empirical cross-country growth regressions have focused on the growth effects of both 
fiscal deficits and individual measure of macroeconomic instability such as inflation and 
the black market premium (see for instance Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Fischer, 1993; 
Corbo and Rojas, 1993; Easterly and Levine, 1994; McMahon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
1995; and Elbadawi and Ndulu, 1994, for a survey). Here we follow an approach that 
differs in three ways from the existing literature. First, we control for the separate 
influence of the fiscal balance to check for the (generally ambiguous) first channel by 
which fiscal adjustment affects growth. Second, we include our measure of 
macroeconomic (in)stability, which reflects the second and unambiguously positive 
channel by which fiscal adjustment boosts growth. Third, our emphasis is on an 
aggregate measure of macroeconomic instability, which could be superior to using (some 
of) its individual components as growth regressors. 
In order to test for the influence of the fiscal balance and macroeconomic instability 
we specify a cross-country long-term growth equation. The equation includes as right-
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Table 11 Long-term macroeconomic instability and public deficits 
2 5 
(Cross-country regressions for 41-52 developing and OECD countries) 
mins = a0 = a, fibal + a2 torb + a3 africa 
Regression Constant fibal torb africa R2A F n 
1. 0 .30 
(2.5) 
-0.06 
(-2.4) 
1.37 
(2.8) 
— 
0.31 9.9 41 
2. 0.51 
(4.4) 
-0.09 
(-4.9) 
— — 
0.27 19.5 52 
3. 0.31 
(2.9) 
-0.04 
(-1.7) 
1.18 
(3.4) 
0.79 
(3.6) 
0.48 13.2 41 
4. 0.49 
(4.5) 
-0.07 
(-4.0) 
— 
0.60 
(3.4) 
0.40 16.4 52 
Note: OLS estimations wi th heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. 
hand determinants a set of variables controlling for initial conditions and growth convergence 
(lgdp6o, the log of 1960 per capita GDP; enpri60, the 1960 primary school 
enrollment rate; and ensecgo, the 1960 secondary school enrollment rate), our indicator 
of macroeconomic instability (mins), terms-of-trade shocks (totsh), structural development 
indicators (trade; the index of trade openness; and lly, the log of the ratio of liquidity to 
GDP), and a political development indicator (civl, the index of civil liberties).23 The 
Barro-type endogenous-growth equation (Barro, 1989, 1990, 1991) is the following: 
g = j80 + 0, lgdpeo + 02 enpri^ + 03 ensec^, + 04 fibal + 05 mins 
+ 06 totsh + 07 trade + 08 lly + 09 civl (4) 
with expected coefficient signs: 0O JO; 0„ 02, 03, 07, 08, 09 >0 ; 05, 06 <0 . 
The sample comprises long-term (1960-1990) country averages for a variable number 
(48 to 82) of developing and OECD countries. Our strategy for estimating Equation (4) 
consists in checking first for the significance of both the fiscal balance (fibal) and 
macroeconomic instability (or its separate components) in explaining long-term 
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Table 12 Growth, fiscal balance, macro instability, and determinants of macro instability 
(Cross-country regressions for 48-49 developing and OECD countries) 
Regression 1 2 3 4 
Constant 
IgdPeo 
enpri60 
ensec60 
fibal 
mins 
inf 
rercv 
debt 
prem 
totsh 
trade 
lly 
civl 
korea 
japan 
africa 
lac 
R2A 
F 
n 
0.022 
(0.9) 
-0.0018 
(0.6) 
0 .000032 
(0.3) 
-0 .0003 
(-3.0) 
0.0002 
(0.5) 
-0.018 
(-4.1) 
-0.005 
(-2.1) 
0.005 
(1.0) 
0.004 
(0.4) 
0.002 
(1.1) 
0.033 
(7.4) 
0 .039 
(4.9) 
-0.016 
(-3.9) 
-0 .004 
(-0.7) 
0.77 
13.1 
48 
0.038 
(1.7) 
-0.0011 
(-0.5) 
-0 .0001 
(-0.3) 
-0.019 
(-7.0) 
-0.033 
-0 .004 
(-2.0) 
0.004 
(2.4) 
0.031 
(8.4) 
0 .033 
(11.3) 
-0 .014 
(-3.6) 
0.75 
18.9 
49 
0.031 
(1.3) 
0.0008 
(0.2) 
-0 .0004 
(-0.5) 
-0 .0003 
(-2.7) 
-0 .0002 
(-0.3) 
0.0008 
(0 .1 ) 
-0 .0029 
(-0.2) 
-0.031 
(-3.2) 
-0.003 
(-4.3) 
-0.005 
(-3.0) 
0 .011 
(2.0) 
0.004 
(0.4) 
0.002 
(1.4) 
0 .036 
(8.3) 
0 .037 
(4.3) 
-0.013 
( -2 .8 ) 
-0.001 
(-0.3) 
0.79 
12.3 
48 
0 .0445 
(1.9) 
-0 .0025 
(-0.9) 
-0 .0003 
(-0.8) 
-0 .0072 
(-0.9) 
0 .0007 
(0.04) 
-0 .023 
(-3.5) 
(-4.6) 
-0 .004 
(-2.8) 
0.003 
(2.2) 
0.034 
(8.0) 
0.028 
(5.5) 
-0 .011 
(-2.7) 
0.76 
14.5 
49 
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growth, controlling for all other growth determinants included in Equation (4). Table 12 
reports the cross-country regression results. 
Four country and regional dummies are added to Equation (4).24 Regressions 1 and 
2 contain macroeconomic instability (mins) as a regressor, while regressions 3 and 4 
contain separately the four determinants of mins — instead of mins — as growth 
regressors. Regressions 2 and 4 omit some of the variables that are not significant in 1 
and 3, respectively. 
The main result to be highlighted here is that the contribution of the fiscal balance 
(fibal) is systematically not different from zero while the significance of macroeconomic 
instability (mins) is always negative and very high.25 This suggests that the first channel 
through which fiscal adjustment could affect growth, by providing more resources for 
domestic investment, is empirically not significant, confirming its theoretical ambiguity. 
However, fiscal adjustment makes a very significant and positive contribution to growth 
by reducing macroeconomic instability. The second conclusion for this sample is that 
while mins is significant in regressions 1 and 2, when testing for the significance of its 
individual components (regressions 3 and 4), two of them are significant while the other 
two are not. The discussion of the role of other growth determinants is deferred to the 
next estimation stage. 
The systematic non-significance of fibal justifies dropping this variable from the 
regression. This allows us to exploit a much larger country sample. Tables 13 and 14 
report cross-country regression results for Equation (4), using a sample of long-term 
averages for 76-82 countries. Country and regional dummies are again added in some 
equations. Table 13 shows four results including mins as a regressor, while Table 14 
reports four analogous results including the four determinants of mins as growth 
regressors. 
The results show a significant role played by 1960 GDP per capita levels and 
primary school enrollment ratios in most regressions. Secondary school enrollment 
shows the wrong sign. Terms-of-trade shocks are not significant. The two structural 
determinants, trade and lly, are sometimes significant, typically depending on the 
inclusion of the dummy variables. The index of civil liberties is not significant here. 
Country dummies for Korea and Japan are systematically significant, reflecting that 
growth in these two countries exceeds that in all other countries by 2-4 percentage points, 
after controlling for all other variables. Are Africa and LAC different from other 
regions? The answer is a resounding yes: after controlling for other factors, Africa 
grows on average by 1.6-1.7 pp less and LAC grows on average by 1.0-1.5 pp less than 
the OECD and other LDCs.26 
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Table 13 Growth and macroeconomic instability 
(Cross-country regressions for 76-82 developing and OECD countries) 
Regression 1 
Constant 
IgdPe, 
enpri60 
totsh 
trade 
lly 
civl 
korea 
japan 
africa 
lac 
R2A 
F 
n 
0.022 
(0.9) 
-0 .0004 
(-0.1) 
0.0002 
(2.3) 
-0 .0002 
(-1.8) 
-0 .008 
( - 2 . 8 ) 
-0 .002 
(-0.8) 
0 .010 
(1.9) 
-0 .004 
(-0.4) 
0.0006 
(0.5) 
0 .034 
(9.8) 
0 .040 
(4.6) 
-0 .017 
(-3.8) 
-0 .013 
(-2.6) 
0.59 
9.9 
76 
0 .054 
(3.2) 
-0 .0050 
(-2.4) 
0.0002 
( 2 . 2 ) 
-0 .006 
(-2.3) 
0 .011 
(2.3) 
0.001 
(0.1) 
0.035 
(11.0) 
0.027 
(4.7) 
-0 .016 
(-3.7) 
-0 .010 
(-2.3) 
0.59 
13.7 
82 
0.032 
(1.9) 
-0 .0037 
(-1.6) 
0.0002 
(2.8) 
-0 .008 
(-3.2) 
0.006 
(1.3) 
0 .017 
(1.7) 
0 .043 
(15.6) 
0 .019 
(2.4) 
0 .044 
(2.3) 
-Q0055 
( - 2 . 1 ) 
0.0002 
(2.9) 
-0.008 
(-3.2) 
0.005 
(1.1) 
0.021 
(2.1) 
0.52 
13.3 
82 
0.42 
13.0 
82 
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Table 14 Growth and determinants of macroeconomic instability 
(Cross-country regressions for 76-82 developing and OECD countries) 
Regression 1 2 3 4 
Constant 0 .027 0 .054 0 .032 0.045 
(1.1) (3.3) (2.0) (2.7) 
IgdPeo -0 .0003 -0 .0045 -0 .0034 -Q0062 
(-0.1) (-2.1) (-1.5) (-2.2) 
enprieo 0.0002 0 .0002 0 .0002 0.0003 
(2.6) (2.8) (3.1) (3.6) 
ensec60 -0 .0002 — — — 
(-2.0) 
inf -0.009 -0 .004 -0 .009 -0.007 
(-0.1) (-0.3) (-0.8) (-0.5) 
rercv -0.023 -0 .024 -0 .025 -0.029 
(-1.5) (-1.7) (-1.5) (-1.9) 
debt 0 .00004 0 .004 0.001 0.001 
(0) (0.7) (0.3) (0.2) 
prem -0.012 -0 .008 -0 .009 0 .009 
(-1.6) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-1.2) 
totsh -0.001 — — — 
(-0.7) 
trade 0 .0052 0 .004 -0 .0005 -Q0020 
(0.7) (0.7) (-0.1) (-0.3) 
lly -0.005 0.001 0 .018 0 .024 
(-0.4) (0.1) (1.9) (2.6) 
civl 0 .000008 — — 
(0) 
korea 0 .033 0 .033 0.04 i — 
(3.0) (3.0) (12.2) 
japan 0 .042 0 .030 0 .020 — 
(3.0) (2.3) (2.4) 
africa -0.017 -0 .016 — — 
(-3.9) (-3.8) 
lac -0.015 -0.011 — — 
(-3.1) (-2.7) 
R2A 0.59 0 .60 0.52 0.43 
F 8.3 11.1 9.9 8.8 
n 76 82 82 82 
Note for Tables 12 - 14: OLS estimations with heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
Data Sources: see Appendix. 
Now consider the influence of macroeconomic instability on growth; mins reduces 
growth significantly in all four regressions, as reflected by a highly significant, average 
regression coefficient of -0.075. Given mins' average sample value of 0.26 in OECD 
countries, it reduces annual growth by 0.2 pp in that region. The much larger sample 
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value of mins in developing countries (equal to 1.19) leads to the important inference that 
macroeconomic instability reduces LDC growth by a very large amount: 0.9 percentage 
point per year. 
What can be said about the individual contribution of the determinants that define 
mins? Table 13 shows that only in one out of 16 cases (4 regressors times 4 regressions) 
does an individual component of mins reach conventional levels of statistical significance. 
This leads to the conclusion that partial proxies for macroeconomic instability are not 
powerful growth inhibitors if taken individually. Growth is only depressed — and then 
massively — by overall macroeconomic instability. 
We conclude three points. First, fiscal adjustment does not contribute to higher 
growth by providing more resources for domestic investment; the empirical non-
significance of the fiscal balance confirms its theoretical ambiguity. Second, fiscal 
adjustment does make a very significant and positive contribution to growth by reducing 
macroeconomic instability. Mins is, however, not influenced only by fiscal adjustment. 
Third, while mins is a central and systematic growth determinant, its individual 
components are seldom significant when taken individually. Finally, Africa (and LAC) 
is different: its growth performance falls well below that in other (mostly Asian) LDCs 
and in OECD economies. 
V Two country cases: Ghana and Zimbabwe 
Ghana and Zimbabwe embody two strikingly different country experiences in Africa, 
vividly illustrating the links between fiscal adjustment, macroeconomic stability, and 
growth.27 In 1983, after many years of high deficits, massive state intervention, and 
dismal growth, Ghana started a deep stabilization and structural adjustment program that 
led to a resumption of positive per capita growth. Zimbabwe, however, put off for 12 
years a deeply needed program of fiscal stabilization and structural adjustment, reaping 
low growth and rising poverty. The country was hit by a major drought in 1992, which 
exposed its fragile public finances and distorted incentive structure, at the time it started 
a major stabilization and structural reform package. 
These two country experiences, discussed in more detail below, illustrate three 
points. First, deep fiscal adjustment is necessary for achieving high growth. Second, 
sustainable fiscal adjustment can only be achieved as a result of a broader public sector 
reform that stabilizes general government finances, eliminates public enterprise deficits, 
and strengthens monetary policy by keeping it separate from fiscal or quasi-fiscal 
demands. Third, macroeconomic stabilization must be complemented by financial and 
trade liberalization to achieve a path of high private investment and growth. 
Ghana 
After achieving independence in 1957, Ghana embarked on a strategy based on import 
substitution and massive public investment in infrastructure and public enterprises that 
led to substantial fiscal deficits and increasing inflationary pressures (Table 15 and Figure 
5). In 1972 a political crisis led to a military coup and the reversal of liberalization 
measures initiated in the late 1960s. Per capita growth fell to zero during the 1970s. 
Economic mismanagement peaked during 1979-1983, with extensive quantitative 
restrictions and controls that severely affected the private sector, inducing low 
investment, shortages, corruption, and widespread rent-seeking activities. In 1983, at the 
onset of the economic recovery program (ERP), the economy was in shambles: the 
consolidated fiscal deficit reached 6% of GDP, inflation exceeded 125%, GDP fell by 
7%, and the black market exchange rate premium reached 2,700%. 
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Figure 5 
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Ghana: Fiscal balance, macroeconomic instability, and per capita GDP 
growth 
The ERP implemented stabilization measures as well as trade and financial sector 
reforms. Fiscal deficits were reduced gradually, monetary expansion was restrained, 
price controls were lifted, producer prices for cocoa were raised substantially, and 
exchange rates and domestic interest rates were liberalized. The fiscal deficit was 
gradually reduced until 1991. Macroeconomic instability declined massively from a level 
of 4.4 in 1982 to 0.6 in 1992 as a result of fiscal adjustment, monetary restraint, and 
foreign exchange market liberalization. The realignment of the real exchange rate and 
agricultural liberalization supported the recovery of exports and investment; the latter 
increased from 9.4% of GDP in 1986 to 15.9% in 1991. Per capita growth resumed to 
reach positive (but only moderate) levels averaging 1.9% per year during 1985-92. 
National saving, however, did not adjust as fast as investment; the current account 
deteriorated from a deficit of 4.6% of GDP in 1986 to 7.0% in 1990, financed to a large 
extent by multilateral lending. 
Despite the success of the ERP in fostering growth, Ghana remains vulnerable to 
adverse terms-of-trade shocks and its fiscal stability is still fragile. The country adopted 
a new constitution in 1992 and held its first democratic elections. Due to political 
pressure, the government granted a massive wage raise to public employees before the 
elections, contributing to the large increase in the deficit from 1.4% of GDP in 1991 to 
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8.2% in 1992. Monetization of the deficit led to a resurgence of inflation in 1993, which 
doubled to reach 25%. The cedi was devalued in nominal terms by 35% in 1992 and 
another 40% in the first 10 months of 1993. 
Although some measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances were implemented in 
1993 and GDP grew at 5%, the resistance of civil servants to wage cuts and the 
incomplete implementation of tax reforms are delaying the required fiscal adjustment. 
Its postponement would hinder the recovery of saving and investment and hence hamper 
Ghana's future growth performance. 
Zimbabwe 
At the time of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was characterized by a policy regime 
that controlled most aspects of economic life and a dualistic economy, where the bulk of 
resources were allocated to a small white minority, at the expense of a large black 
majority that had very limited access to education, health, and other public services. As 
a result, the new government's strategy was aimed at reducing social inequality and 
inducing extensive state involvement in productive activities, as well as a highly regulated 
environment for private investment. 
Despite important social achievements, improvements in the overall standard of living 
have been rather disappointing. Large public deficits, increasing macroeconomic 
instability, excessive market regulations, and recurrent droughts have hindered growth; 
per capita GDP remained stagnant during 1980-1993 (Table 16 and Figure 6). Public 
sector imbalances, worsened by a vast loss-making state-enterprise sector, have been at 
the heart of the country's difficulties. The deficit of the consolidated non-financial public 
sector, comprising the general government and public enterprises, shows double-digit 
levels in almost every year since 1981. Some fiscal adjustment was achieved in 1987, 
when the deficit was brought down from roughly 14% to 10% of GDP. Additional fiscal 
adjustment has been pursued since 1991 in the framework of a structural adjustment 
program, but has not been reflected in declining fiscal deficits in part due to the 
massively adverse budgetary impact of the 1991/92 drought. 
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Figure 6 Fiscal balance, macroeconomic instability, and per capita growth 
Public deficit financing has relied successively on foreign and domestic sources. 
External financing during the early 1980s led to a significant rise in the foreign debt: 
from 15% of GDP in 1980 to 56% in 1985. Subsequently deficit financing relied on 
issuing domestic debt and money, reflected in an increasing domestic public debt and a 
record inflation of 46% in 1992 that doubled the previous peak reached in 1983. 
Public sector deficits are the driving force behind Zimbabwe's current account 
deficits. During 1981-85, declining current account deficits were associated with a 
cumulative 56% depreciation of the real exchange rate. Subsequently, from 1985 to 
1990, the real exchange rate did not change much while the current account deficit 
showed a small deficit. As a result of partial trade liberalization since 1991, and mainly 
due to the recent drought, the current account deteriorated in 1991 and attained a record 
level of 15.1% of GDP in 1992. A significant current-account correction was achieved 
in 1993, supported by a 23.1% cumulative real exchange rate depreciation between 1990 
and 1993. 
Zimbabwe's large public sector disequilibrium has contributed to a systematic erosion 
of macroeconomic stability. Its index of macroeconomic instability, which at 1.5 in the 
early 1980s was only slightly above Africa's average 1970-1990 level of 1.22, has 
deteriorated steadily to reach 2.6 in 1993. But macroeconomic policy failures are only 
partly to blame for Zimbabwe's unsatisfactory performance. In fact, a large array of 
trade and factor market distortions have hampered investment and growth. Domestic 
price controls have been prevalent in agriculture, utilities, and transport; controlled 
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interest rates have seldom exceeded domestic inflation rates. Foreign trade has been 
subject to large tariff and quantitative trade restrictions, and foreign exchange has been 
rationed by the government on a discretionary basis. These trade barriers have 
maintained significant import substitution at the cost of severely affecting the 
development of a more efficient production structure. 
An ambitious adjustment program, initiated in 1991, has focused on more stringent 
fiscal and monetary policies, supported by a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. 
Progress has been made in the areas of domestic price liberalization, private investment 
deregulation, and trade liberalization. However, much more progress is required in 
liberalizing domestic goods and financial markets as well as external trade, restructuring 
and privatizing state enterprises, and deregulating private sector production and 
investment. These structural measures should complement further fiscal adjustment as 
prerequisites for Zimbabwe's convergence toward a path of higher and sustained growth. 
VI Conclusions 
This paper has provided empirical backing to the relations between fiscal adjustment, 
macroeconomic performance, and growth observed across the world and during the 1960 
- 1990 period. The long-run world experience has provided an explicit reference for 
assessing Africa's performance during the last three decades. 
The three major developing-country regions (Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and other LDCs) show a remarkably similar fiscal picture. Their average 
long-term public deficit at 6.0% of GDP is almost three times the comparable level found 
in OECD countries. Tax revenue is low in the three regions, falling 20 percentage points 
of GDP short of the OECD's tax collection. However, other LDCs (mostly Asian 
economies) display more macroeconomic stability than African and LAC countries and 
a growth performance that, at the same level as that of OECD countries, is a multiple of 
the low growth achieved by Africa and LAC. 
Fiscal and macroeconomic variables influence each other in both directions. On the 
causality from macroeconomic variables to public deficits, we conclude that deficits are 
very sensitive to short-term domestic and foreign macroeconomic shocks but that policy 
makers — not the macro shocks — are to blame for persistent deficits and to be praised 
for sustained fiscal adjustment. 
Cross-country econometric evidence drawn from a world sample on the long-term 
sensitivity of the level of tax revenue collection to macroeconomic variables shows that 
the level of development (measured by GDP per capita) is the single most important 
determinant of tax revenue. Inflation inhibits tax collection in all regions except Africa. 
But adverse terms-of-trade shocks are more important in Africa than in other regions in 
inhibiting tax collection. Finally, OECD countries are able to collect 8-10 percentage 
points of GDP more in taxes than developing nations, after controlling for their higher 
level of development and lower inflation. 
Turning to the reverse causality — from fiscal variables to macroeconomic 
performance — the paper followed a two-stage approach: from fiscal adjustment to 
macroeconomic stability and to growth. Long-run cross-country regression results show 
that a prudent fiscal stance and central bank independence are significant determinants 
of macroeconomic stability across the world. However, once controlling for these two 
determinants, macroeconomic stability is still significantly lower in Africa than in all 
other regions. 
What can be said about the contribution of fiscal adjustment to growth, inferring from 
cross-country growth regressions for a large world sample? First, lower public deficits 
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do not contribute to higher growth by providing more resources for domestic investment; 
the empirical non-significance of the fiscal balance in growth regressions confirms its 
theoretical ambiguity. Second, fiscal adjustment does make a very significant and 
positive (but indirect) contribution to growth by reducing macroeconomic instability. The 
latter is, however, not influenced only by fiscal adjustment. Third, while macroeconomic 
stability is a principal and systematic growth determinant, its individual components 
(inflation, real exchange rate variability, foreign debt, and the black market premium) are 
typically not significant as growth determinants when taken individually. Hence partial 
indicators of macroeconomic health or stability, on which previous cross-country growth 
studies have relied, seldom contribute significantly to growth. Finally, Africa (and LAC) 
is different: its growth performance falls well below that in other LDCs and in OECD 
economies, after controlling for all relevant growth determinants. 
Ghana and Zimbabwe represent strikingly dissimilar country cases in Africa that 
illustrate vividly the links between fiscal adjustment, macroeconomic stability, and 
growth. Their experience suggests that deep fiscal adjustment is necessary for achieving 
high growth. Both countries also illustrate that sustainable fiscal adjustment can only be 
achieved as a result of a broader public sector reform that stabilizes general government 
budgets, eliminates public enterprise deficits, and strengthens monetary policy by keeping 
it immune from fiscal or quasi-fiscal demands. Finally, macroeconomic stabilization 
must be complemented by financial and trade liberalization in order to attain a path of 
high private investment and growth. 
Notes 
1. A comprehensive survey of fiscal deficit measurement is Blejer and Cheasty 
(1991). Other references on alternative deficit measures include Blejer and Chu 
(1988), Buiter (1987), Kotlikoff (1988), Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993b, 
1994a), Fischer and Easterly (1990), and Tanzi (1985). International Monetary 
Fund (*1986) and United Nations (1968) discuss differences between cash and 
accrual measures in more detail. Robinson and Stella (1988) and Teijeiro (1989) 
survey issues concerning quasi-fiscal deficits. 
2. Nominal-deficit measures are criticized by three recent approaches as irrelevant for 
assessing the sustainability of fiscal policy or its effects on inter-generational 
equity. Hence they focus on the inter-temporal path of fiscal policy, deficits, and 
their financing. A first and very popular method, pioneered by Buiter (1983, 
1985, 1987) and van Wijnbergen (1989), compares actual deficits to sustainable 
deficit levels consistent with a stationary macroeconomic equilibium. An 
alternative approach, due to Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Grilli (1989), Wilcox 
(1989), and Buiter and Patel (1990), focuses directly on how public debt evolves, 
checking for public sector solvency by comparing the rate of growth of the public 
debt ratio (to output) to the real interest rate. The third method, pioneered by 
Kotlikoff (1992) and associates (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 1991, 1992, 
1994). fosuces on the inter-temporal budget constraint of the public sector and on 
the inter-generational consequences of fiscal policy. It consists of computing the 
effects of all explicit, implicit, and contingent government programs on taxes paid 
by and payments received by each cohort, subject to government and cohort inter-
temporal budget constraints. This allows evaluation of all intergenerational 
transfers among current and future generations. 
3. The four regions are sub-Saharan Africa (noted as Africa, with a maximum of 36 
countries), Latin America and the Caribbean (noted as LAC, with a maximum of 
21 countries), North Africa, Middle East and Asia (noted as other LDCs, with a 
maximum of 16 countries), and OECD member countries (noted as OECD, with 
a maximum of 18 countries). Countries, data definitions, and sources are listed 
in the Appendix. 
4. For a recent study of money demand and seignorage-maximizing inflation rates in 
high-inflation developing countries, see Easterly, Mauro and Schmidt-Hebbel 
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(1994). 
5. The terms macroeconomic stability and health are used interchangeably. This lack 
of precision is justified by the combination of first and second moment variables 
in the index of macroeconomic stability (or health) introduced below. 
6. The inflation cost measure is defined as: inf = (annual CPI inflation)/(l + annual 
CPI inflation). This measure reflects the capital loss caused by inflation to money 
holders, i.e., the tax rate corresponding to the inflation tax revenue (see Easterly, 
Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994). In addition to the inflation measure, different 
measures of inflation variability were initially considered for the index of 
macroeconomic instability, but were dismissed because of their high correlation 
with the inflation cost measure. 
7. On the components of mins it can be said that inf is bounded between 0 and 1 and 
that the other three variables are also positive and rarely exceed 1. All-country 
sample averages for mins and its components are: mins = 0.99, inf = 0.12, rercv 
= 0.23, debt = 0.39, and prem = 0.26 
8. To a first approximation, each major type of financing corresponds to a 
macroeconomic imbalance, if used excessively. Money creation to finance the 
deficit often leads to inflation; domestic borrowing leads to a credit squeeze and 
crowding out of private investment and consumption; external borrowing leads to 
current account deficits and real exchange rate appreciation. 
9. Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994a) report statistically significant correlations 
between CNFPS deficits and per capita GDP growth (negative), private 
consumption (positive), the current account deficit (positive), and the black-market 
exchange rate premium (positive), for a cross-country sample of 50-59 OECD and 
developing countries. 
10. These variables also affect public expenditure so that the net impact on the public 
deficit is often ambiguous, as illustrated by the case of Zimbabwe discussed above. 
For a detailed discussion see Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994a). Dornbusch, 
Sturzenegger, and Wolf (1990) discuss how inflation affects tax collection and 
expenditure. 
11. A more general usage of the Keynes-Olivera-Tanzi effect than the tax erosion effect 
is when one refers to the overall impact of inflation on the primary deficit, 
including the effects on public expenditure (See Olivera, 1967, and Tanzi, 1977, 
1978). 
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12. Most of the estimated tax revenue functions are reported in the country studies in 
Easterly, Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994). The regressors of tax revenue 
include macroeconomic variables (which affect tax bases) and tax rates (or tax 
regimes). 
13. Note that tax revenue excludes the surplus of the National Coffee Fund, which 
increases with a devaluation. For Colombia's budget structure of the late 1980s it 
was estimated that the overall public deficit grew with a real exchange rate 
devaluation (Easterly, 1994). 
14. Recent volumes on fiscal, macroeconomic, international finance, and international 
trade dimensions of taxation, based on general-equilibrium models, are Helpman, 
Razin, and Sadka (1988), Razin and Slemrod (1990), and Frenkel and Razin (1992). 
On tax systems and tax reforms in developing countries, see Gillis (1989), Ahmad 
and Stern (1991), Ito and Krueger (1992), and Burgess and Stern (1993). 
15. Some feedback effects from tax revenue to both per capita GDP levels and inflation 
cannot be ruled out. In addition, other potential determinants of tax collection have 
been excluded from Equation 2. See Tanzi (1991) for empirical measures including 
otherr regressors and Burgess and Stern (1993) for a discussion. 
16. Other regional dummy variables were found to be not significant. 
17. They report a barely significant contribution of the log of per capita GNP and a low 
overall fit (R2A = 0.04). While our sample is smaller than their group of 82 
developing countries, it is much more representative in the time dimension, 
extending over 32 years instead of their three-year averages around 1987. 
18. Among the latter it has even been argued that severe but credible fiscal adjustment 
can be expansionary in the short run, based on Denmark's and Ireland's adjustment 
experiences during the 1980s (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). 
19. One should also point out that the contribution of fiscal adjustment to higher 
national saving (and hence to both higher domestic investment and lower foreign 
saving) is particularly strong due to the empirically-observed interest-insensitivity 
of private saving. The reason is that the possible interest-rate reduction brought by 
fiscal adjustment will not depress private saving. There is a growing empirical 
consensus that private saving is insensitive to the real interest rate (i.e., that the 
income, substitution, and wealth effects of interest rates approximately neutralize 
each other), based on the studies for developing countries by Giovannini (1983, 
1985), Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), and Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, and Corsetti 
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(1992), and the country studies in Easterly, Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994). 
20. Among the surveys of empirical studies on Ricardian Equivalence in industrial 
economies, four conclude that Ricardian Equivalence is rejected (Hayashi, 1985; 
Hubbard and Judd, 1986; Bernheim, 1987; and Leiderman and Blejer, 1988), while 
only one survey finds broad support for the hypothesis (Seater, 1993). 
21. While this relation offers the advantage of simplicity, this comes at the potential 
cost of specification and simultaneity biases. Simultaneity problems should not be 
too important. First, the measure of central bank independence (torb) is probably 
not much influenced by mins or its four components. Second, two components of 
mins (the black market premium and RER variability) have no direct effect on the 
size of the fiscal balance, and a third component (inflation) contributes little to 
deficits in the long term, as was concluded in the preceding sub-section. This 
leaves only the stock of foreign debt as having potential influence on the size of the 
fiscal balance through foreign interest payments. 
22. Regional dummies for LAC and other LDCs were found to be not significant. 
23. Other variables of political development and stability, such as coups, revolutions, 
and assassinations, were found to be not significant. 
24. Korea and Japan are two of the high-growth outliers noted in section 2. A dummy 
variable for the third outlier (Botswana) was found to be not significant in these 
regressions. A third regional dummy for other LDCs was also not significant. 
25. Part of the low significance of fibal obviously reflects the inclusion of mins. 
The way to address this would be by using an instrument for fibal that is 
orthogonal to mins, but such an instrument is not readily available for this large 
sample of countries. 
26. The LAC dummy was not significant in the smaller sample regressions reported 
in Table 16. 
27. On the relation between fiscal adjustment and macroeconomic performance see 
Islam and Wetzel (1994) for Ghana and Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994) for 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
tax: total conventional (direct and indirect) tax revenues as percentage of GDP 
(IMF Government Financial Statistics), 
fibal: fiscal balance (negative for a deficit) as percentage of GDP. When 
available, consolidated public sector deficit is used (Easterly, Rodriguez 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994). Alternatively the central government deficit is 
used (IMF Government Financial Statistics), 
mins: the macroeconomic instability index is a combination of four equally-
weighted indices (inf, normalized inflation, prem, the normalized black 
market premium, rercv, the real exchange rate coefficient of variation, and 
debt: foreign debt as percentage of GDP). Inflation and the black market 
premium (x) are normalized to x/(l +x). The inflation rate is CPI inflation 
(IMF International Financial Statistics) and the black market premium is 
from Picks Currency Yearbook. The coefficient of variation of the real 
exchange rate is computed from 1970-1990 real exchange rate series (IMF 
International Financial Statistics). The index mins ranges from zero (total 
instability) to around four (maximum instability), 
torb: turnover rate of the head of the central bank or monetary authority, defined 
as the average number of appointments in the 1950-1988 period. The rate 
ranges between zero (more stable) to 1 (more unstable) (Cukierman, Webb 
and Neyapti 1992). 
Igdp: average real per capita GDP level in US$ (IMF International Financial 
Statistics). 
g: geometric average growth rate of real per capita GDP during 1960-1990 
(World Bank 1993 Growth Project). 
Igdpa,: average real per capital GDP level in US$ in 1960 (World Bank 1993 
Growth Project). 
enpri^: total primary school enrollment in 1960 (or closest available year) (World 
Bank 1993 Growth Project), 
trade: volume of trade (exports plus imports) as percentage of GDP (World Bank 
1993 Growth Project), 
lly; total liabilities of the banking sector as percentage of GDP (World Bank 
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1993 Growth Project), 
totsh: income loss from adverse terms of trade shocks as percentage of GDP 
(World Bank 1993 Growth Project), 
civl: index of civil liberties, which ranges from 1 (more liberties) to 7 (more 
repressive) (WB 1993 Growth Project), 
kor, jap, africa and latina: 
dummies for Korea, Japan, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Data Coverage 
All variables cover the period 1960-1990, except for the following, FIBAL, MINS, 
RERCV, DEBT (1970-1990) and TAXREV (1970-90) for Latin American countries 
and the OECD; 1960-90 for other regions. 
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Country Coverage 
Africa Latin America Other LDCs OECD 
1 Benin 37 Argentina 58 Bangladesh 75 Australia 
2 Botswana 38 Boliva 59 India 76 Austria 
3 Burkina Faso 39 Brazil 60 Indonesia 77 Belgium 
4 Burundi 40 Chile 61 Korea, Rep. 78 Canada 
5 Cameroon 41 Colombia 62 Malaysia 79 Denmark 
6 Central Africa 42 Costa Rica 63 Pakistan 80 Finland 
Republic 43 Dominican Republic 64 Papua New Guinea 81 France 
7 Chad 44 Ecuador 65 Philippines 82 Germany 
8 Congo 45 El Salvador 66 Sri Lanka 83 Greece 
9 Cote d'lvoire 46 Guatemala 67 Thailand 84 Italy 
10 Ethiopia 47 Haiti 68 Egypt, Arab Rep. 85 Japan 
11 Gabon 48 Honduras 69 Iran, Islamic Rep. 86 Netherlands 
12 Gambia, the 49 Jamaica 70 Jordan 87 NewZealand 
13 Ghana 50 Mexico 71 Morocco 88 Norway 
14 Guinea 51 Nicaragua 72 Syrian Arab Republic 89 Spain 
15 Kenya 52 Panama 73 Tunisia 90 Sweden 
16 Lesotho 53 Paraguay 74 Turkey 91 Switzerland 
17 Liberia 54 Peru 92 U.S.A 
18 Madagascar 55 Trinidad and Tobago 93 U.K. 
19 Malawi 56 Uruguay 
20 Mali 57 Venezuela 
21 Mauritania 
22 Mauritius 
23 Nigeria 
24 Nigeria 
25 Rwanda 
26 Senegal 
27 Sierra Leone 
28 Somalia 
29 Sudan 
30 Swaziland 
31 Tanzania 
32 Togo 
33 Uganda 
34 Zaire 
35 Zambia 
36 Zimbabwe 
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